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Articles 
THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT 
OF 2003 AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Allan Ides* 
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA), 
signed into law on November 5, 2003, by President Bush/ bans 
the use of partial-birth abortions throughout the United States 
except when necessary to save the life of the mother. Specifi-
cally, section 1531(a) of PBABA provides: 
Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and 
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. This subsection 
does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to 
save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physi-
cal disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a 
life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from 
the pregnancy itself. This subsection takes effect 1 day after 
the enactment.2 
Section § 1531(b) defines the term "partial-birth abortion"3 and 
extends coverage of the prohibition to any "individual" who per-
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Ange-
les. Thanks to Bill Araiza, David Burcham, Brietta Clark, Brannon Denning, Kurt Lash, 
Karl Manheim, Christopher May, and Robert Pushaw for their helpful comments and 
criticisms. 
I. See 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1540 (Nov. 5, 2003). 
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 153l(a) (West 2004). 
3. "[T]he term 'partial-birth abortion' means an abortion in which the person per-
forming the abortion-
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the 
case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the 
mother, or, in the case of a breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past 
the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an 
overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and 
441 
442 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:441 
forms a partial-birth abortion, regardless of whether that person 
is a licensed medical practitioner.4 The phrase "partial-birth 
abortion" is highly charged and designedly so. It is the preferred 
usage of those who object to the dilation and extraction method 
of abortion as inhumane. I use the phrase "partial-birth abor-
tion" throughout the text simply because it is language adopted 
by PBABA. 
Congress passed similar bans in 1996 and 1997, both of 
which President Clinton vetoed. 5 Three years after the second 
veto, and while Congress was considering a third version of the 
ban, the Supreme Court decided Stenberg v. Carhart,6 holding 
that Nebraska's prohibition on partial-birth abortions unduly 
burdened a woman's right to choose. Despite Stenberg, congres-
sional efforts to ban partial-birth abortions continued. Unques-
tionably Congress was fully aware of Stenberg and its potential 
constitutional im~lications when it revisited the issue and passed 
PBABA in 2003. Not too surprisingly, debate on the constitu-
tionality of PBABA compared this statute with the ill-fated Ne-
braska statute, contesting whether PBABA also imposes an un-
due burden on a woman's right to choose.8 My focus, however, is 
on a separate constitutional concern, namely, whether PBABA 
represents a valid exercise of the commerce power, the expressly 
identified authority under which the statute was enacted.9 On 
this seemingly significant question, the legislative record is rela-
tively spare and the post-enactment debate largely silent. 
(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the par-
tially delivered living fetus .... 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(1) (West 2004). 
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(2) (West 2004). 
5. H.R. Doc. No. 104-198, at 1 (1996) (President Clinton's veto message on the 
1996 legislation); H.R. Doc. No. 105-158, at 1 (1997) (President Clinton's veto message 
on the 1997 legislation). 
6. 530 u.s. 914 (2000). 
7. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 6-24 
(2003) (discussing Stenberg); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16-22, 
25, 32 (2003) (same); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002: Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2-3, 15, 19, 
21-25,30,41,47-48 (2002) (same). 
8. It was on this basis that three district courts temporarily enjoined enforcement 
of PBABA. See Jonathan Groner, Challengers to Abortion Law Rally Around the Prece-
dent, LEGAL TIMES, November 10, 2003, at 3; see also Nat'! Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 
287 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Neb. 
2003). 
9. See H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 34 (2003) (PBABA constitutional authority 
statement). 
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It is possible that the constitutionality of PBABA will be re-
solved without any reference to the commerce power. That pos-
sibility depends, however, on the stability of the Stenberg deci-
sion. While principles of stare decisis lend support to that 
stability, Supreme Court Justices have been known to shift and 
modify their views in the abortion context. Any variation be-
tween the Nebraska statute and PBABA could tilt a swing Jus-
tice in an unanticipated direction. Moreover, no one can accu-
rately predict what the composition of the Court will be if and 
when PBABA arrives there for review. Thus, given the possibil-
ity of either doctrinal shift or personnel change at the Supreme 
Court, one cannot disregard other potentially dispositive consti-
tutional issues. Certainly if the Stenberg majority does not hold, 
the question of congressional power might become central to the 
controversy. But perhaps more importantly, if the doctrine of 
enumerated powers is to be taken seriously, some thought ought 
to be given to the enumerated power that ostensibly serves as 
the basis for this enactment, if for no other reason than a respect 
for constitutional structure. Sound constitutional analysis dic-
tates that the power to legislate be established before subjecting 
an act of Congress to external limits such as those imposed by 
the due process clause. 
In what follows, I suggest that the constitutionality of 
PBABA is subject to serious doubt under surrent commerce 
clause doctrine. That is not to say that PBABA is "clearly" or 
"plainly" unconstitutional. The nuances of the Rehnquist 
Court's commerce clause doctrine are yet to be fully developed, 
and just as the Court's decision in Stenberg can be revised, so too 
can the Court's approach to the commerce clause. And, of 
course, reasonable minds can differ at the outer edges of applica-
tion. But given the Rehnquist Court's most recent pronounce-
ments on the commerce clause, one cannot help but conclude 
that PBABA represents, at best, a very poor effort to craft a 
piece of legislation in conformity with the obvious and applica-
ble elements of constitutional doctrine. 
BASIC COMMERCE CLAUSE STANDARDS 
BRIEFLY CONSIDERED 
Pursuant to the commerce power, Congress may regulate 
both interstate commerce and certain activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce. As to the regulation of interstate 
commerce itself, Congress is empowered to regulate the chan-
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nels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as 
thinRs or persons in or using those channels or instrumentali-
ties. 0 Since the New Deal, the Court has not found a single "first 
category" exercise of the commerce clause to have exceeded the 
scope of the granted power. The same cannot be said of the sec-
ond category. Under the category involving the regulation of 
matters that substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress 
does not direct its power at interstate commerce itself, but at 
matters outside commerce which nevertheless influence it. In 
this context, the modern Court has imposed discernable limits on 
congressional power, and one sitting Justice has even suggested 
that the category is without constitutional justification and ought 
to be abandoned. 11 The first question, therefore, is whether 
PBABA regulates interstate commerce itself, and hence is rela-
tively immune from judicial oversight, or whether it merely regu-
lates matters that affect interstate commerce, potentially subject-
ing the statute to more active judicial oversight. 
PBABA prohibits the performance of any partial-birth 
abortion "in or affecting interstate ... commerce. "12 At first 
blush, this language may suggest that the statute represents an 
exercise of both aspects of the commerce power, the regulation 
of interstate commerce itself-the performance of a partial-birth 
abortion "in" interstate commerce-and the regulation of an ac-
tivity that substantially affects interstate commerce-the per-
formance of a partial-birth abortion "affecting" interstate com-
merce. Yet, it is doubtful that word "in" as used in PBABA 
signifies an attempt to regulate the channels or instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce. For one thing, it is not clear how a par-
tial-birth abortion could be performed "in" interstate commerce 
in any but the most bizarre circumstances. Nor does the phrasing 
of the statute ("a physician who, in ... interstate ... commerce, 
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion") sensibly apply to a 
physician who travels in interstate commerce and then performs 
a partial-birth abortion. Rather, the language connotes that it is 
the performance of an abortion itself that must take place in in-
10. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
II. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 860 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined 
by Scalia, J.) (expressing "no view" on whether the federal arson statute may constitu-
tionally be applied to all buildings used for commercial activities). 
12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 153l(a) (West 2004). The statute also pertains to matters in or 
affecting foreign commerce. There being no discernible difference between interstate 
commerce and foreign commerce for these purposes, the discussion in the text is fully 
applicable in the foreign commerce context as well. 
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terstate commerce. In any event, the "affecting" interstate com-
merce language would seem perfectly suited to cover the "travel-
ing" physician. Hence, I take the "in or affecting" language as 
embracing the performance of partial-birth abortions that in 
some manner affect interstate commerce. In other words, I will 
treat PBABA as an instance of the second category of commerce 
regulation, the so-called "substantially affects" test. 
In United States v. Lopez 13 and United States v. Morrison, 14 
the Court, for the first and then the second time in almost sixty 
years, restricted the breadth of the "substantially affects" test. In 
both cases, the Court held that Congress exceeded its commerce 
power by attempting to regulate matters that were noneconomic 
and that had at best an attenuated connection with interstate 
commerce.15 The two key questions under Lopez/Morrison are, 
first, whether the regulated activity is economic and, second, 
whether that activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 
These questions, although distinct, are intertwined in the sense 
that a. negative answer to the first question, if not wholly disposi-
tive, makes a negative answer to the second significantly more 
likely. Our answer to the second question may also be informed 
by the presence or absence of congressional findings or a statu-
tory jurisdictional element, and by whether the regulated activity 
is one that has been traditionally left to the states. 
I turn now to the first step of the Lopez/Morrison analysis, 
namely, the economic activity element. 
IS PERFORMANCE OF A PARTIAL-BIRTH 
ABORTION ECONOMIC ACTIVITY? 
Lopez held that gun possession in a school zone was not 
economic in any conceivable sense of that word. Morrison ar-
rived at the same conclusion with respect to gender-based vio-
lence.16 A key factor in each case was the absence of an element 
of commercial exchange embedded in the respective statutory 
scheme. Had the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) re-
quired possession with the intent to sell, the economic nature of 
13. 514U.S.549(1995). 
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
15. See Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Rea-
son in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563 (2001). 
16. I do not agree with Court's perception of the noneconomic nature of the crimes 
in Lopez and Morrison. See id. at 567-70. But regardless of my views, clearly Lopez and 
Morrison state the law to be applied in this context. Hence, whether a particular activity 
is "economic" can only be measured by the standards explicit and implicit in those cases. 
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the regulated activity in Lopez would have been established. In-
terestingly enough, the defendant in Lopez was planning to sell 
his gun. That's why he brought it to school. But this fact was ir-
relevant to the Court's characterization of defendant's conduct 
as noneconomic since application of GFSZA did not require any 
such showing. In other words, GFSZA regulated only the none-
conomic part of the defendant's transaction, namely, his posses-
sion of the gun, and simple possession, in the Court's estimation, 
was noneconomic. Stated somewhat differently, from a constitu-
tional perspective, the fact that Lopez himself was on an eco-
nomic mission was irrelevant in the absence of an economic 
statutory element. 
The performance of a partial-birth abortion bears a close 
resemblance to the noneconomic possession of a gun. Just as 
possession of a gun can occur without any commercial element, 
the performance of a partial-birth abortion-indeed, the per-
formance of any medical procedure-can be accomplished with-
out a commercial overlay. It may be that most medical proce-
dures, including partial-birth abortions, are done for hire. But 
this does not alter the simple fact that the procedure itself, un-
adorned by any commercial exchange, is noneconomic in the 
same sense as is gun possession. And just as GFSZA did not in-
clude an intent-to-sell element, PBABA does not require that 
the abortion be performed for hire. In other words, PBABA 
regulates only the noneconomic part of the transaction, namely, 
the performance of the medical procedure. If simple gun posses-
sion is noneconomic, then the performance of an abortion, un-
adorned by a commercial element, must be similarly character-
ized. 
The constitutional analogy between gender-based violence 
and partial-birth abortions leads to the same conclusion. The 
Violence Against Women Act (V AWA), the statute at issue in 
Morrison, imposed no commercial overlay on its regulation of 
gender-based violence. Of course, an act of gender-based vio-
lence is in no way dependent on the presence of a commercial 
transaction. The same is true of a partial-birth abortion. By way 
of contrast, there are some activities, and some crimes, that are 
inherently commercial. Perez v. United States 11 provides a useful 
example. In that case, the Court rejected a commerce clause 
challenge to a federal statute, the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act, which criminalized extortionate credit transactions. An ex-
17. 402 u.s. 146 (1971). 
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tortionate credit transaction is inherently commercial since it in-
volves the extension of credit. As a consequence, the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act can be fairly described as a regulation of 
economic activity and in this sense is quite distinguishable from 
VA W A. PBABA much more closely resembles VA W A in this 
regard than it does the Credit Consumer Protection Act. In 
other words, there is nothing inherently commercial about either 
performing an abortion or engaging in gender-based violence. 
As a consequence, neither activity is economic as the Court used 
that word in both Lopez and Morrison. 
Does the fact that a physician performing a partial-birth 
abortion provides a service to the patient alter the conclusion 
that the regulated activity is noneconomic? After all, the provi-
sion of a service does represent a type of unilateral transfer of 
wealth, even when the service is provided gratis. Still, this type of 
"economic" transfer lacks the commercial characteristics the 
Court deemed critical in Lopez and Morrison. Hence, while gun 
possession, which involves neither service nor exchange of any 
kind, is distinguishable from the performance of abortion in this 
respect, the distinction has no constitutional significance. Nei-
ther activity is commercial; hence, neither is economic. As a con-
sequence, the service character of a partial-birth abortion should 
make no constitutional difference unless the Court is inclined to 
extend its economic activity test beyond its current foundation. 
The potential distinction between service activities and non-
service activities is further undermined when one compares the 
physician's service under PBABA to the gender-based violence 
regulated under VA W A. Clearly, gender-based violence cannot 
be characterized as a service. Rather than doing something "for" 
somebody, the perpetrator is doing something "to" somebody. 
Yet this verbal play between prepositions merely underscores 
the constitutional similarity between these activities. Both the 
performance of an abortion and the infliction of violence involve 
physical interaction between human beings. Moreover, the en-
tire thesis of PBABA is that the performance of a partial-birth 
abortion is an act of violence. Indeed, the doctor is not being 
punished for the service he provides, but for the crime he com-
mits when he kills the fetus. In other words, he is punished for 
what he does "to" the fetus. Thus, the prohibition of partial-birth 
abortions, under the reasoning of Morrison, surely falls into that 
category of punishing violent, noneconomic crimes beyond the 
reach of the commerce power. In short, the fact that the physi-
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cian provides a service does not alter the noneconomic nature of 
the activity under Lopez/Morrison. 
An activity that is in itself noneconomic may still be treated 
as economic if its regulation is "an essential part of a larger regu-
lation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could 
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 18 The 
classic case is Wickard v. Filburn. 19 There the Court upheld the 
power of Congress to regulate wheat grown and consumed on 
the farm on the theory that regulation of these activities was es-
sential to the regulation of wheat sold in interstate and foreign 
commerce, a target of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 
The Court in Filburn accepted the government's argument that 
the aggregate effect of wheat consumed on the farm "would 
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions."20 
Just as the Filburn rationale was not applicable to GFSZA, there 
being no larger regulation of economic activity of which GFSZA 
was a part, nothing in PBABA suggests that the prohibition of 
partial-birth abortions is part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity. Rather, the partial-birth abortion prohibition is a stand-
alone measure designed to address what its proponents see as an 
immoral act, independent of any larger economic or commercial 
considerations. In the words of the Lopez Court, "It cannot ... 
be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities 
that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, 
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate 
commerce. "21 To rule otherwise would be to grant Congress a 
general police power like that of the states, and this is something 
the Court is quite unprepared to do.Z2 
Of course, if PBABA applied only to abortions-for-hire, the 
resulting commercial overlay would transform the otherwise 
noneconomic act of abortion into economic act of abortion-for-
hire. Yet nothing in PBABA expressly imposes such a limiting 
construction. Perhaps one could interpret the phrase, "in or af-
fecting interstate commerce," as designed to accomplish that 
end. There are, however, at least two obstacles to this interpreta-
tion. First and most pertinently, the language simply does not 
carry that meaning. In Justice Scalia's words, "A text should not 
be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it 
18. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
19. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
20. Id. at 128. 
21. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
22. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
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should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly 
means."23 The evident meaning of the "in or affecting" language 
pertains to the location of or consequences generated by the 
matter regulated, and not to the nature of the regulated activity. 
The Rehnquist Court's decision in Jones v. United States 
supports this conclusion.24 At issue in Jones was the scope of a 
federal arson statute that prohibited the arson of a building 
"used in" interstate commerce or in an activity affecting inter-
state commerce.25 In construing the statute to apply only to the 
arson of commercial buildings, the Court distinguished between 
a statute that broadly defined the crime "as the explosion of a 
building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate 
commerce" and one that required that the damaged or de-
stroyed property "must itself have been used in commerce or in 
an activity affecting commerce. "26 In the former context, the "af-
fecting interstate commerce" language would embrace both 
commercial and noncommercial activities-that is, all activities 
that might affect interstate commerce. In the latter context, 
however, the "used in" terminology limits the scope of the pro-
scription to the destruction of commercial facilities. As the Jones 
Court phrased it, "The key word is 'used."'27 PBABA, quite 
clearly, contains no language limiting the scope of the affects test 
and, therefore, falls into that category of statutes that purport to 
embrace the broad array of activities, both commercial and non-
commercial, that might affect interstate commerce. Since 
PBABA was enacted after the 2000 decision in Jones, we may 
fairly assume that Congress drafted PBABA in light of this judi-
cially crafted distinction. 
Second, and closely related, the key doctrinal development 
in Lopez and Morrison was the distinction between the nature of 
the re~ulated activity and its potential effect on interstate com-
merce. 8 To interpret the phrase "in or affecting interstate com-
merce" as pertaining to the nature of the activity fails to account 
23. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997). 
24. 529 u.s. 848 (2000). 
25. 18 u.s.c. § 844(i) (1994). 
26. 529 U.S. at 854. 
27. !d. 
28. Justice Breyer's dissent in United States v. Morrison rejected the majority's eco-
nomic activity test, in part, because of the obvious fact that noneconomic activity can also 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at 655, 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The 
majority did not deny this assertion; rather, it rested on the formal distinction between 
economic and noneconomic activity and on the historical fact that the Court had never 
validated a congressional regulation of noneconomic activity. 529 U.S. at 611 n.4. 
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for this doctrinal separation and confuses the effect on interstate 
commerce with the nature of the activity being regulated. To 
adopt this broader interpretation would be to eviscerate both 
Lopez and Morrison, for if any activity that affects interstate 
commerce is by definition an economic activity, then the distinc-
tion between economic and noneconomic activity becomes ir-
relevant. In short, the "in or affecting interstate commerce" lan-
guage cannot be fairly read as limiting the scope of PBABA to 
abortions-for-hire. 
The congressional confusion on this score is reflected in the 
House report accompanying PBABA?9 According to that re-
port, "[t]he provision of abortion services, including partial-birth 
abortions, is clearly commerce. "3° For this proposition, the re-
port relies on a statement of former Attorney General Janet 
Reno. That statement, however, was issued before the decision 
in Lopez, and, more importantly, is premised on the economic 
transactions related to the provision of those services. The au-
thors of the report were, perhaps, making the same type of as-
sumption when they stated, "the performance of a partial-birth 
abortion, as with the performance of any abortion, is an eco-
nomic transaction in which a service is performed for a fee. "31 Of 
course, this statement is both imprecise and incorrect. The per-
formance of an abortion is itself noneconomic unless that per-
formance is rendered for a fee. This lack of precision in the con-
gressional report reflects a misunderstanding of Lopez and 
Morrison that may well have adversely affected the drafting of 
PBABA. 
Of course, Congress could rewrite PBABA to include an "abor-
tion-for-hire" requirement, but that possibility merely underscores the 
fact that Congress did not do so. Interestingly, Congress was notified 
of this problem early on in the legislative process. In testimony before 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Louis Seidman ex-
plained: 
Here, as in Lopez, the regulated activity is not "economic." 
Having an abortion is no more a commercial activity than 
possessing a gun. True, most (although by no means all) abor-
tions are purchased, and Article I probably does reach legisla-
tion that would prohibit the payment of money for certain 
types of abortions (at least in cases where an effect on inter-
29. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58 (2003). 
30. /d. at 23. 
31. ld. at 24. 
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state commerce can be shown). But most guns are also pur-
chased. Just as Congress can regulate the interstate purchase 
of guns, but not the intrastate possession, so, it would seem, it 
can regulate the interstate purchase of abortions, but not the 
intrastate procedure itself. 3 
451 
Congress chose to ignore this concern. In any event, for present 
purposes, the only question is whether PBABA is constitutional, 
not whether a hypothetical statute yet to be drafted might itself 
pass constitutional muster. 
DOES THE NONECONOMIC CHARACTER OF THE 
ACT OF PERFORMING OF AN ABORTION 
PRECLUDE REGULATION OF THAT ACTIVITY 
PURSUANT TO THE COMMERCE POWER? 
The short answer is that it probably does, at least under the 
watchful eye of the current Court. Those seeking to invoke the 
commerce power in this context would do well to heed the words 
posted over Dante's Gate of Hell: "Lasciate ogne speranza, voi 
ch'intrate."33 ("All hope abandon, ye who enter here.") True, 
neither Lopez nor Morrison imposed a categorical rule against 
the regulation of noneconomic activity. Yet the tenor of both 
decisions comes very close to making the barrier all but impene-
trable. In the words of the Morrison Court, "While we need not 
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any 
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in 
our nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is eco-
nomic in nature."34 In Lopez, the Court stated the matter some-
what differently: "Where economic activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained."35 Of course, this affirmative recognition of the power 
to regulate economic activity does not necessarily negate the 
power to regulate noneconomic activity, but given the context of 
this quotation, it is clear that the Court was attempting to draw a 
circle within which congressional power would be validated and 
outside of which the exercise of such power would, at the very 
least, be suspect. There is no hint in either Lopez or Morrison 
32. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 190, 193 (1995) (prepared statement of Louis Michael 
Seidman). 
33. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY, The Inferno: Canto 3, /. 9. 
34. 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added). 
35. 514 U.S. at 560. 
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that the Court is looking to alter this historical fact. Rather, both 
decisions tend toward the creation of an enclave of activity im-
mune from congressional regulation. At the very least, the none-
conomic nature of a regulated activity presents a strong pre-
sumption that the activity is beyond the reach of the commerce 
power, leading to a type of commerce clause scrutiny that may 
well be "strict in theory, but fatal in fact. "36 
Of course, the Supreme Court hasn't said, "Never," and so 
the door to regulation of noneconomic activity pursuant to the 
commerce power is certainly not double-bolted. Let us assume 
then that the noneconomic character of the regulated activity is 
not wholly dispositive, that there remains at least a possibility, 
albeit remote, of overcoming the presumption of unconstitution-
ality. Presumably that possibility would require that the chal-
lenged statute be distinguishable in some significant way from 
the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison. There are four ques-
tions, each examined in Lopez and Morrison, that might serve as 
a basis for discovering a constitutionally relevant distinction: 
First, has regulation of the activity been traditionally left to the 
states? Second, did Congress make findings pertaining to the 
perceived effect of that activity on interstate commerce? Third, 
does the statute include a jurisdictional element? Fourth, does 
the activity substantially affect interstate commerce? I turn now 
to these questions to determine if PBABA can be distinguished 
effectively from GFSZA and VA W A. 
IS THE ACTIVITY REGULATED BY PBABA 
ONE THAT HAS BEEN TRADITIONALLY LEFT 
TO THE STATES? 
In Morrison, the Court explained its holding in part by ob-
serving that "[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local."37 This quote, I be-
lieve, captures the essence of Lopez and Morrison. These deci-
sions reflect an effort to cabin the power of the federal govern-
ment by recognizing an enclave of traditional state authority 
insulated from federal interference. I have argued elsewhere that 
the economic activity test serves as a proxy for this reinvigorated 
36. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
37. 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
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principle of federalism.38 Thus, one way to determine whether an 
activity is "truly national" or "truly local" is to examine the 
potential economic character of that activity. Noneconomic 
activity is presumptively (or perhaps definitively) "truly local" 
and hence beyond the power of Congress. A second way to 
measure the nationaVlocal distinction is more direct. Simply ask 
whether the regulation of the activity at issue has traditionally 
been left to the states. If so, principles of federalism may prevent 
Congress from invading this province of state prerogative. For 
example, in Morrison the Court found that the regulation of 
violent crime was truly a matter of local concern: 
In recognizing this [distinction between what is truly national 
and truly local] we preserve one of the few principles that has 
been consistent since the [commerce] Clause was adopted. 
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is 
not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods in-
volved in interstate commerce has always been the province 
of the States. Indeed, we can think of no better example of 
the police power, which the Founders denied the national 
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression 
of violent crime and vindication of its victims. 39 
We have already concluded that the performance of a par-
tial-birth abortion is noneconomic. Is the regulation of that activ-
ity also one that has been traditionally reserved to the states? In 
other words, is the regulation of this medical procedure some-
thing that can be fairly characterized as a truly local concern? I 
believe the answer to this question is "yes" for three reasons. 
First, as the sponsors of PBABA recognized, the activity being 
regulated-the performance of a partial-birth abortion-is a vio-
lent crime, namely, the killing of a fetus.40 The proscription ap-
plies not only to licensed medical practitioners, but also to any 
"individual" who performs the prohibited act. Moreover, the in-
trastate act of aborting a fetus is not directed at instrumentali-
ties, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce. In this 
sense, PBABA reaches into what the Morrison Court perceived 
as the quintessential example of state prerogative, namely, the 
38. See Ides, supra note 15, at 578-80. 
39. 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
40. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 5 
(2003) (describing state laws proscribing partial-birth abortions as "criminal bans"); see 
also The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 172, 173, 186 (1995) (prepared statement of Douglas W. Kmiec) 
(describing partial-birth abortions as homicides). 
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suppression of violent crime, "which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States. "41 Second, in 
the Court's own words, albeit in a slightly different context, "the 
field of health care [is] a subject of traditional state regulation. "42 
That is not to say that the regulation of economic activity within 
the field of health care is absolutely immune from federal regula-
tion.43 But the regulation of the noneconomic aspects of medical 
procedures may well be, given both the tradition of state pre-
rogative in this field and the absence of any "truly national" in-
terest in this subject area. Third, the regulation of abortions, 
both before and after Roe v. Wade,44 has remained the exclusive 
province of the states subject only to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. While Congress, in the exercise of its spending powers,45 
has imposed limits on the federal funding of abortions, the actual 
regulation of abortions has remained a state prerogative. 
In short, the activity regulated by PBABA is both none-
conomic and, by tradition and constitutional design, a matter 
that has remained within state prerogative. In Morrison, the 
Court observed, "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the none-
conomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to 
our decision in that case."46 Consistent with this observation, the 
constitutionality of PBABA may turn on the noneconomic, truly 
local nature of the conduct being regulated. At the very least, 
the intersection between the noneconomic nature of the regu-
lated activity and the traditional role of the states in regulating 
that activity creates a strong presumption against the constitu-
tionality of the congressional effort to regulate it. 
DID CONGRESS MAKE FINDINGS PERTAINING 
TO THE PERCEIVED EFFECf OF PARTIAL-BIRTH 
ABORTIONS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE? 
As part of its "independent evaluation of constitutionality 
under the Commerce Clause" the Court will "consider legislative 
findings, and indeed even committee findings, regarding effect 
41. 529 U.S. at 618. 
42. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,237 (2000). 
43. Cf New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 705 (1995) (establishing a presumption against federal regulation of 
health care as a field traditionally left to the states). 
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
45. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding authority of Congress 
to refuse to fund abortions under Medicaid). 
46. 529 U.S. at 610. 
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on interstate commerce."47 The goal of this examination is to 
illuminate the congressional judgment that the regulated activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce. Such findings are nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient to establish constitutional validity. 
The more extensive the findings and the more detailed the evi-
dentiary support, however, the more likely it is that a court will 
incorporate the congressional judgment into its application of 
the substantially affects test.48 
PBABA does include extensive findings.49 However, none 
of those findings pertain to interstate commerce. Rather, they 
are designed as a response to what Congress perceived as the er-
roneous factual predicate of the Stenberg decision and to the le-
gal question of whether the Court ought to defer to these alter-
native congressional findings. The House report accompanying 
PBABA does contain a brief description of the perceived effect 
on interstate commerce,50 and certainly a federal court would 
take that discussion into account when applying the substantially 
affects test. 
According to the House report the performance of a partial-
birth abortion has the following effects on interstate commerce: 
"[B]ecause so few abortionists perform partial-birth 
abortions, women seeking to obtain a partial-birth 
abortion are more likely to have to travel out-of-State 
to find an abortionist willing to perform the proce-
dure."51 
"[P]artial-birth abortions are usually performed in an 
outpatient clinic or facility which is likely to 'purchase 
medicine, medical supplies, surgical instruments, and 
other supplies produced in other States. "'52 
"[A]bortionists who perform partial-birth abortions 
advertise their services across state lines. "53 
Taken as a whole, these three assertions provide a clear pic-
ture of what the authors of the report perceived as the potential 
effects on interstate commerce-namely, interstate travel, pur-
47. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
48. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964). 
49. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 
1201, 1201-06 (2003). 
50. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 24-25 
(2003). 
51. /d. at 24. 
52. /d. at 25. 
53. /d. 
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chases, and advertising. That outline of potential interstate con-
sequences is certainly clear enough to direct a court toward ask-
ing the right questions. For example: How much travel interstate 
is generated by the performance of partial-birth abortions? What 
is the extent of interstate purchases related to the performance 
of partial-birth abortions? To what extent is the interstate adver-
tising of abortion services related to the procurement of partial-
birth abortions? The report, however, provides insufficient fac-
tual information to begin to answer these questions. To extent 
that these assertions can be deemed "congressional committee 
findings," at best they direct our attention toward the questions 
to be asked but not toward the answers. That is a valuable ser-
vice, of course, but not one that comes close to resolving the 
constitutional issue presented. 
DOES PBABA INCLUDE A JURISDICTIONAL 
ELEMENT AND, IF SO, IS THE PRESENCE OF 
THE ELEMENT SUFFICIENT TO VALIDATE THIS 
EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER? 
As to the first question, the answer is "yes." The "in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce" language creates a juris-
dictional element that requires the government to prove a con-
nection with commerce in every prosecution under PBABA. 
The inclusion of this element distinguishes PBABA from the 
statutes in both Lopez and Morrison, neither of which included 
any reference to interstate commerce. The question then be-
comes whether the inclusion of this jurisdictional element is, in 
itself, sufficient to sustain PBABA. I think not for two related 
reasons, one general and the other specific to PBABA. 
First, nothing in either Lopez or Morrison suggests that the 
presence of a jurisdictional element automatically guarantees a 
statute's constitutionality. The Lopez Court saw the value of a 
jurisdictional element as a device that could limit the reach of a 
statute "to a discrete set of" activities that "have an explicit con-
nection with or effect on interstate commerce. "54 But the Lopez 
Court did not hold or even suggest that the presence of such an 
element was sufficient to sustain the exercise of congressional 
power. The resolution of that question requires at least some ex-
amination of the jurisdictional element at issue. Similarly, in 
Morrison, the Court, noting the absence of a jurisdictional ele-
54. 514 U.S. at 562. 
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ment in VA W A, observed that the inclusion of such an element 
"would lend support to the argument that [a particular prohibi-
tion] is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce."55 To say that an 
item lends support to a proposition is not to say that this item es-
tablishes that proposition. In short, from the Court's perspective, 
the presence of a jurisdictional element is useful, but neither 
necessary nor sufficient to sustain any particular exercise of the 
commerce power. That brings me to my second point-namely, 
the insufficiency of PBABA's jurisdictional element. 
Some jurisdictional elements may fully resolve the constitu-
tional inquiry. For example, a statute that made it a crime to en-
gage in gender-based violence on an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce would surely be sustained as a "first category" regula-
tion of interstate commerce, for the jurisdictional element fully 
embraces the entire constitutional standard. 56 PBABA's jurisdic-
tional element does not, however, fully embrace the applicable 
standard. The phrase "in or affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce" is notable for its failure to include the adverb "substan-
tially," a word that the Lopez Court found to be constitutionally 
significant. 
Within this [affecting commerce] category, admittedly, our 
case law has not been clear whether an activity must "affect" 
or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to be 
within Congress' power to regulate it under the commerce 
clause. We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our 
case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether 
the re~~lated activity "substantially affects" interstate com-
merce. 
Even if a prosecutor could show that the performance of a par-
ticular partial-birth abortion affected interstate commerce, it 
would not necessarily follow that this abortion substantially af-
fected interstate commerce. Nor would the satisfaction of this 
element establish that partial-birth abortions as a class satisfy the 
substantially-affects standard. In other words, the jurisdictional 
element does not resolve our constitutional dilemma for the sim-
ple reason that it does not ask the right question. 
55. 529 U.S. at 612; see also id. ("Such a jurisdictional element may establish that 
the enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce.") (empha-
sis added). 
56. 529 U.S. at 613 n.5. 
57. 514 U.S. at 559 (citation omitted); accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. 
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Perhaps an example will help. Suppose a woman drives 
from Iowa to Nebraska to procure a partial-birth abortion. A 
reasonable argument could be made that the performance of the 
abortion affected interstate commerce-but for the abortion the 
woman would not have engaged in interstate travel. Yet this 
"reasonable argument" does not establish that the commerce-
affecting abortion substantially affected interstate commerce or, 
more importantly, that such abortions as a class exert such an ef-
fect. Indeed, a single trip across the state line would seem rather 
trivial. In any event, PBABA's jurisdictional element does not in 
any fashion resolve the critical question-namely, whether the 
performance of partial-birth abortions, either singly or in the ag-
gregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Hence, PBABA's jurisdictional element merely limits the 
scope of the proscription to commerce-affecting abortions; it 
does not validate the legislation as a measure that regulates mat-
ters that substantially affect interstate commerce. Given that 
PBABA's jurisdictional element does not resolve the constitu-
tional dilemma, we move to the final question. 
DO PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY 
AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE? 
In Wickard v. Filburn,58 a farmer sought to enjoin enforce-
ment of a marketing penalty imposed on "that part of his 1941 
wheat crop which was available for marketing in excess of the 
marketing quota established for his farm" under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA).59 The penalty resulted from the 
farmer having sowed an excess of 239 bushels of wheat, which 
were then consumed on the farm. Among other things, the 
farmer argued that enforcement of the AAA against him was in-
consistent with the commerce clause since the impact on inter-
state commerce of his 239 bushels of farm-consumed wheat was 
by itself trivial. After discussing the economics of the interstate 
wheat market, the Court disagreed: 
The effect of consumption of homegrown wheat on interstate 
commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most vari-
able factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop. Consump-
tion on the farm where grown appears to vary in an amount 
greater than 20 per cent of average production .... The effect 
58. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). For a detailed discussion of Filburn and its current rele-
vance, see Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003). 
59. 317 U.S. at 113. 
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of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be 
produced for market and the extent as well to which one may 
forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own 
needs. That appellee's own contribution to the demand for 
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him 
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his con-
tribution, taken together with that of many others similarly 
situated, is far from trivial. ... One of the primary purposes of 
the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat 
and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect 
the market. It can hardly be denied that a factor of such vol-
ume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a 
substantial influence on price and market conditions .... This 
record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have 
considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if 
wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a sub-
stantial effect in defeating and obstructing !ts purpose to 
stimulate trade therein at increased prices. 60 
459 
The Lopez Court described Filburn as supporting the 
proposition that Congress may regulate intrastate, noneconomic 
activity when the regulation of that activity is "an essential part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated."61 Under such circumstances, the aggregated effects 
of the intrastate, noneconomic activity can be considered in de-
termining whether the activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce. 62 The key is the presence of some larger economic 
scheme at which the regulation is directed. The Court refused to 
apply this principle in Lopez since GFSZA had "nothing to do 
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise."63 In other 
words, because there was no larger economic scheme at stake, 
aggregation was not permissible. The Court also refused to apply 
Filburn's aggregation principle in Morrison, where it reiterated 
its view "that, in every case where we have sustained federal 
regulation under the aggregation principle ... the regulated ac-
tivity was of an apparent commercial character. "64 In short, un-
der Filburn, and consistent with Lopez and Morrison, applica-
tion of the aggregation principle requires that either the 
60. /d. at 127-29. 
61. 514 U.S. at 561. 
62. /d. 
63. /d. 
64. 529 U.S. at 611 n.4. 
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regulated activity itself be economic or that its regulation be part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity. 
Given that the activity regulated by PBABA- the perform-
ance of a partial-birth abortion-is noneconomic, and that its 
regulation is not in any manner part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity, Lopez and Morrison bar a court assessing the 
constitutionality of PBABA from considering the aggregate ef-
fects of partial-birth abortions on interstate commerce. Rather, 
the entire focus of the inquiry in any particular case must be on 
the single act on which the prosecution is based-namely, 
whether this specific partial-birth abortion substantially affected 
interstate commerce. Here, a variant of farmer Filburn's argu-
ment regarding trivial effects should prevail since the effect of 
any single partial-birth abortion on interstate commerce is likely 
to be insubstantial. 
Even if one were to aggregate the effects of partial-birth 
abortions on interstate commerce, it is not clear that the substan-
tially affects standard could be satisfied. The problem here is not 
conceptual, as it was in Lopez and Morrison where Congress 
sought to "pile inference upon inference" to establish the requi-
site connection with interstate commerce.65 Under PBABA 
there is no apparent need to pile inference upon inference. In-
stead, the "committee findings" in the House report accompany-
ing PBABA focus attention on a relatively discrete causal chain 
between the performance of the abortion and interstate com-
merce. What is lacking under PBABA is a factual predicate suf-
ficient to establish that the effect on interstate commerce is sub-
stantial. As noted previously, the key questions requiring factual 
elaboration are: How much travel interstate is generated by the 
performance of partial-birth abortions? What is the extent of in-
terstate purchases related to the performance of partial-birth 
abortions? To what extent is the interstate advertising of abor-
tion services related to the procurement of partial-birth abor-
tions? Without the facts necessary to answer these questions, we 
cannot fully assess the connection between the performance of a 
partial-birth abortion and its effect on interstate commerce. At 
this point those facts have not been introduced into the defense 
of the statute. 
In addition, to determine whether the performance of par-
tial-birth abortions in the aggregate substantially affects inter-
state commerce, we will need to know how many such abortions 
65. 514 U.S. at 567; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15. 
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are performed. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court observed that 
"[t]here are no reliable data on the number of [partial-birth] 
abortions performed annually. Estimates have ranged between 
640 and 5,000 per year."66 A survey by the Alan Guttmacher In-
stitute, a pro-choice organization, put the number at 2,200 for 
the year 2000, which is up from 363 in 1996.67 Pro-life advocates 
put the number somewhat higher. From a purely economic per-
spective, regardless of whose statistics one credits, these are not 
particularly large numbers given the overall size of the U.S. 
economy. One wonders whether they are sufficient, even in the 
aggregate, to establish a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. By way of contrast, the Filburn Court concluded that 
wheat grown for consumption on the farm varied "in an amount 
greater than 20 per cent of annual [wheat] production"68 and 
"that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed 
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market 
conditions."69 The Court went on to detail why this was so. 
Significantly, the Lopez Court described Filburn as "perhaps the 
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over 
intrastate activity."70 That being the case, the significantly 
weaker argument that partial-birth abortions exert a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce would seem to fall well short of 
the historical reach of the commerce power over intrastate activ-
ity. Of course, as I've noted several times, even this observation 
generously assumes that the Court will even consider the sub-
stantially affects argument given the noneconomic nature of the 
regulated activity. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary weakness to the claim that PBABA represents 
a valid exercise of the commerce power is that the activity regu-
lated by PBABA- the performance of a partial-birth abortion-
is noneconomic as that term has been used by the Rehnquist 
66. 530 U.S. at 929. 
67. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States, 
/995-/996, FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECfiVES, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 263, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3026398.html (363 D&X abortions in 1996); 
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United 
States in 2000, PERSPECfiVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCfiVE HEALTH, Jan./Feb. 2003, 
at 6, 13, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/joumals/3500603.html (2,200 D&X 
abortions in 2000). 
68. 317 U.S. at 127. 
69. /d. at 128. 
70. 514 U.S. at 560. 
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Court. Under Lopez and Morrison, this flaw is quite likely fatal 
to the claim of congressional power. And even if not fatal, the 
presumption of unconstitutionality established by the none-
conomic nature of the regulated activity is further bolstered by a 
combination of the traditional role of the states in regulating vio-
lent crime and health care and by the relative weakness of the 
argument that partial-birth abortions substantially affect inter-
state commerce. To counter this presumption, PBABA's propo-
nents will, at the very least, have to develop a factual record that 
fairly establishes the substantial relationship between the per-
formance of partial-birth abortions and interstate commerce. 
Yet the noneconomic nature of the regulated activity may make 
it doctrinally impermissible to aggregate effects and thereby 
eliminate the possibility of using even a post hoc rationalization 
to satisfy the substantially affects test. In addition, while the 
presence of a jurisdictional element may lend some support to a 
claim of constitutionality, the jurisdictional element in PBABA 
falls short because it fails to require that the effect on commerce 
be substantial. Finally, it is also worth keeping in mind that Jus-
tice Thomas may not be willing to validate any exercise of con-
gressional power under the substantially affects test, potentially 
aligning himself with the "liberal" wing of the Court in a chal-
lenge to PBABA. 71 
71. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
